Flock Off

And then we have this little collection of reindeer games:

A quiet battle is happening across the US right between towns working to adopt Flock Safety systems and those trying to ban them entirely. From major cities like Los Angeles canceling its Flock contract to towns wrapping Flock AI cams in plastic bags because Flock won’t take them down, it’s a wild time for surveillance and questions about government accountability.

But what happens when you start seeing Flock’s now-recognizable solar panels and AI cameras going up in your neighborhood? What happens when they start to recognize your car or even individual people?

I don’t want to say what I really feel, at this point, because I may get into trouble.  Still, being who I am, I can’t help thinking of this kind of solution:

Then, purely in the spirit of scientific inquiry, I’m wondering if this might work:

Curious, that’s me.  But if you’re going to test the stuff, you may want to get some soon before it mysteriously starts to vanish off the shelves at Home Depot, or from Amazon’s warehouses.

Little Brother

It’s one thing to have to deal with the Gummint snooping on your every move — literal, and figurative (i.e. your online activities) — but it’s another thing to having GlobalMegaCorp sniffing into your business as well.

Here’s how all this started:

Ruter, the [Norwegian] transit authority that runs public buses across Oslo and Akershus, parked two electric buses inside an isolated facility built into a mountain, the kind of shielded space normally used to keep radio signals from leaking in or out, and let its own security engineers take them apart. One bus came from Yutong, the Chinese manufacturer that has quietly become one of Europe’s largest electric bus suppliers. The other was a three-year-old unit from VDL, a Dutch manufacturer. Ruter chose that pairing deliberately: the two buses sit at opposite ends of how connected a modern transit vehicle can be.

And the findings?

Ruter’s own published findings are blunt about the VDL [Dutch] bus: it has no capability for over-the-air software updates at all. Every change to its systems requires a technician to physically connect a cable. That makes it a hassle to service. It also makes it nearly impossible to hijack remotely, which is exactly why Ruter’s engineers moved past it quickly.

The Yutong [Chinese] bus is the opposite. It receives software and diagnostic updates automatically, the same way a phone downloads a firmware patch overnight, except this particular phone weighs roughly 30,000 pounds and carries dozens of passengers through Oslo traffic. That connection routes through a Romanian SIM card, which gives Yutong direct digital access to the bus’s battery and power management systems. Ruter’s engineers concluded that, in theory, this access could be used to stop the bus or render it inoperable, not through some elaborate hack, but simply because the manufacturer already has a standing door into those systems for legitimate diagnostic and update purposes.

Wile all this is alarming, it’s not really surprising.  We’ve known for ages that the godless ChiCommies have their dirty little ears glued to just about every damn piece of electronic equipment our friends (!) in Silicon Valley have outsourced to their manufacture.

So now we get to the part that makes me start fixing a lunch bucket, scoping out high buildings and cleaning the Mauser.

None of what Ruter found is exotic. It’s the standard architecture of any modern connected vehicle, and American drivers have been living with a version of it for nearly two decades. General Motors’ OnStar system can, at the company’s discretion, send a cellular command to a stolen vehicle that blocks the ignition from restarting once it’s parked, or gradually slows a moving vehicle so police can recover it safely. That is functionally the same category of access Ruter found in the Yutong bus: a persistent, manufacturer-controlled cellular link with authority over propulsion-adjacent systems, built into the vehicle before it ever reaches a customer’s driveway.

So Big Auto are a bunch of snooping smegma-eaters.  We know that, too.

The distinction that actually matters here isn’t whether a manufacturer can reach into a vehicle remotely. Almost every connected car sold today allows that, by design, for updates, diagnostics, and theft recovery. What matters is who holds the authority to use that access, under what legal process, and how many vehicles go dark at once if that access is ever misused, subpoenaed, or compromised.

A single stolen sedan getting slowed to a stop by its own manufacturer is a feature working as intended. An entire transit authority’s bus fleet answering to a remote command from a foreign supplier’s server is a different order of risk entirely, which is exactly why Ruter escalated this to Norway’s national government instead of treating it as an IT ticket.

Now comes the part that has me checking Ye Olde Ammoe Locquer for 8x57mm:

Chinese abuse of this little backdoor activity [sic] is bad, but in the bigger picture, it can be addressed with a carefully-aimed chunk or two of explosive material on the Three Gorges Dam.

What worries me more is that this little pipeline into our cars can also be — and is — at the beck and call of the auto manufacturers, who are only too ready to “share” that data with, say, the insurance industry (hello, fresh revenue stream), and if pressed just a little, with our own Gummint ghouls who infest the alphabet agencies (DHS, NSA, FBI, just to name the three biggest dicks aimed at out collective rectums).

I need to get to the range.  So if you’ll excuse me…

 

Shine A Little Light

Here’s an interesting story.  A journalist has been plagued by a troll who has followed all her writings and articles, and infested the comments section with mean and nasty little snarks.  So the journo decided to find out exactly who this person was, and she actually went to the troll’s house (lair!) to confront her;  but the troll wasn’t home.  Go and read the details.  (I couldn’t post an excerpt because the article has been preserved as a screen save rather than as text, but the link should be good.)

Read more

Incompetence So Great

Back when I was rebuilding a grocery chain’s loyalty program, I encountered a situation that was apparently not at all uncommon:  astonishing incompetence.  Here’s what happened.

I’d relaunched our loyalty card in our Long Island stores, in the face of fierce competition.  Long Island, while geographically tiny, is densely populated and therefore had a huge number of grocery chains in the area at the time:  A&P, Pathmark, ShopRite, Stop & Shop and our company Grand Union.  In addition, there was any number of independent operators, ranging from bodegas to large stores located in a single town or area.  It was, at the time, quite probably the most competitive grocery market in the world.  No single chain had more than 3% market share, for example.

Which is why, when I joined Grand Union to fix their loyalty program, the management committee insisted that the relaunch take place in Long Island.  (I’d suggested taking a small area such as Connecticut to test the program, but for strategic reasons, Long Island was the division in most trouble, so that was what I had.)

Anyway, I did the thing:  redesigned the card’s appearance (to distinguish itself from the older card) and taking previous customer spending as a benchmark, stratified customers into “Platinum”, “Gold” and “Regular” groups.

This, by the way, was a cause of great consternation to the management group and to Operations, who for decades had treated every customer as equal.  That was nonsense, of course;  when I analyzed the data, it worked out that each store’s financial viability depended on a very few customers.  In large stores, the per-store actual count was about 2,000 shoppers, and in smaller stores, much less — as little as 1,100 customers.  As I put it to management, if I were to write a letter to all those top customers, telling them to stop shopping with us or they’d be murdered, we’d have to close all our stores inside a month.  Not only did those 20%-odd account for about 72% of total sales, they accounted for nearly 90% of our gross profits.  (Which makes sense, because those top customers shopped the whole store, most especially the high-margin departments such as Deli, Produce, Scratch Bakery and Butchery.)

I’d also redesigned our advertising approach.  Instead of relying on those familiar weekly store “flyers” (distributed in newspapers and in the stores themselves), we would stop using flyers altogether and do direct mail offers only to our Platinum and Gold customers, sponsoring both production costs and markdowns by reallocating the print spend.  I didn’t care about the “regular” customers, who not only shopped just the weekly discounted items (low margin) but hardly spent anything in the rest of the store.  I didn’t even care if they stopped shopping with us altogether, because the benefits accrued (lower staff counts and more-profitable sales) would more than make up for the expected sales loss.  (Just to be clear on this, it wasn’t just supposition on my part.  In my previous consultancy job, I’d steered several chains into a similar direction, with almost universal success.)

Of course, the resistance I got from, well, just about everyone, was fierce.  The only thing that saved me was that the CEO was on board with my plan, as was a key board member, who’d been a client from a previous job, as CEO of his supermarket company in Chicago.

Anyway, we launched the new program, and as the sales were reported weekly and not daily, I sat back confidently to await the results.

Which were catastrophic.  Relaunch week showed sales down by nearly forty(!) percent.  I nearly had a heart attack.

Then I went into the data, and started looking at the daily sales.  Hmmm, what was this?  No sales reported at all for the first three days of the promotion week (Wednesday through Friday) — I mean, zero sales, not a single dollar.  Clearly, something was amiss.

So I went over to the IT department to see what had happened.  It turned out that they had chosen that same week to test a new software product which collected the in-store returns, collapsed the data to make it all fit into the data pipe back to head office, then opened the zipped files once on the mainframe.  Well, the program hadn’t worked at all, resulting in the loss of three days’ sales data.

I nearly had a heart attack, again.  The most disturbing thing was the attitude of the IT department — essentially an insouciant shrug, accompanied by “Well, it’s working now so your data will get better.”

To say I was enraged would be the world’s largest understatement.  My own boss was likewise angered, but not as much as I was because he was not a data person.

The CEO was unavailable, so I went off to see the CFO.  (A little background:  he was a recent arrival at Grand Union, but as luck would have it, we’d met before during my earlier career when I’d been advising his company — a Florida chain — with their own loyalty card program.  He’d been very impressed with my input, his finance brain immediately understanding the financial implication of customer segmentation;  but I’d been unable to implement the new program because I’d quit to join Grand Union.)

I walked into his office in a white-hot rage, but somehow managed to hold back.  In calm, but very lucid tones, I outlined what had happened and what the effect had been on our data.  To say he was appalled would also be a huge understatement.  “The data is completely lost?  We can’t retrieve it at all?”

Back in those days, data storage was not the simple and inexpensive task it is today, so at store level, once the data had been shipped off to head office, the space was cleared to make way for the next week.

He looked at me.  “Of course, I’m going to make sure that Management knows all about this at our next meeting.  But how did this happen?”

I thought about it for a moment, then said, “It is difficult to comprehend incompetence on this scale.  I am not a paranoid person, but if I were, I would suspect sabotage.”

I told you all that, so you could look at this situation on the same basis.

New Jersey Gov. Mikie Sherrill had to confess that some 6,600 noncitizens landed on the Garden State’s voter rolls in 2023-24, and 400 voted.

And:

“I am appalled by the reckless failures that allowed this to happen and the lack of transparency shown by those in charge at the time,” Sherrill, just six months into her first term, said in a statement.

Yeah, I’m sure she is.

Sherrill blamed system software for the “error” and pledged an investigation into the alarming failure. She said she’s also canning the vendor involved.

Of course it’s the software’s fault. [eyecross]  But the oversight of the data?  That’s not the vendor’s job, it’s her state government’s remit, and that’s the biggest failure.  More to the point:

New Jersey’s registration “glitch” is just the latest in a growing record of noncitizens doing what Democrats and their accomplice media friends say rarely happens: registering and voting in U.S. elections.

“The revelation comes as President Donald Trump and other Republicans continue to assert that voting by noncitizens is rampant in U.S. elections, even though it’s rare and, when caught, can be punished as a felony that can lead to deportation,” useful idiot Geoff Mulvhill wrote in his coverage of the scandal. 

When caught? Such crimes are rarely caught due to lack of interest by many election and law enforcement officers on the front and back ends of the system. Democrat policymakers have bent over backwards to be “inclusive” and “equitable” in voter rights legislation, at the expense of election security. 

Now let’s revisit my words to Grand Union’s CFO:

“It is difficult to comprehend incompetence on this scale.  I am not a paranoid person, but if I were, I would suspect sabotage.”

It’s clear that Democrats, in New Jersey and indeed nationwide, are cooking the books everywhere:

This is why they’re refusing to open their respective voters’ rolls to federal scrutiny and verification — not to hide their incompetence, but their sabotage of probably our most important institution:  the vote.

Feel free to be as enraged now as I was back then.


Afterwards:  The head of IT at Grand Union was fired couple of months after my meeting with the CFO.  His replacement?  The guy who had authorized the use of the new data-compression software.  He was not only found to be truly incompetent (duh), but I was actually approached to head up the corporate IT department — an offer I declined, with thanks.

As for the relaunched program:  the Long Island group became the most profitable of all Grand Union’s divisions, and sales grew every month thereafter, resulting in a full point of market share growth.  Then the CEO retired, and his successor announced that the new loyalty program would not be allowed to roll out into the other areas (upstate New York, New Jersey, Connecticut and Vermont).  More to the point, my advertising campaign was to be shut down and the company would revert to the old store flyer program.

I resigned immediately.

Grand Union went out of business three years later.

Captain Obvious Pays A Visit

Apparently, there is a strange antipathy to Marxism in one particular part of the country.  And some Democrat bint has just found that out:

Florida Democrat Party Chair Nikki Fried admitted that socialism is not selling as easily in Florida — home to many people who escaped communist or socialist regimes.

“You know, we have hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people that call Florida home, that left communists and socialists and authoritarian regimes to find a better way of life here in the state of Florida,” Fried said.

So the people who actually had to live under Communism don’t want to repeat the exercise in their adopted country… who knew?

Rising Rage

Having been crucified by the godless trolls of the IRS many times in the past, I loathe those bloodsucking thieves — not personally, but the system which recruits and nurtures their behavior.  What exacerbates this loathing is what my (and everyone else’s) tax “donations”* are mostly funding.

If you thought “Welfare” (37%), go to the head of the class.

And if you want to see why that 37% is so high, all you have to see is this little exchange:  as the man says:  “The fact this one dude – by himself – can walk into any state and find blatant fraud everywhere he goes proves two things: 1) the fraud is rampant at an unprecedented scale and 2) the government agencies who are supposed to protect our tax dollars are either completely incompetent or complicit in the fraud.”

In other words, that 37% is a target for embezzlers and fraudsters, and the government either doesn’t care or actively allows their activity.  (And depending on which department we’re talking about, one could add “encourages” to “allows”.)

I’m not even sure that going to the range is going to help this one.


*”donations” collected at gunpoint.