And One More Unnecessary Law

I noted in the above two articles that we shouldn’t need more laws to underline what is either Constitutional precept or else self-evident.  Here’s the third example:

No law currently prevents Congress members from having dual citizenship

Act for America is pressuring Congress to pass legislation to ban people with foreign citizenship from serving in the House and Senate.  The Virginia-based national security advocacy group said the lack of a prohibition on Congress members with dual citizenship was a “dangerous loophole.” 

“This bill should never have been necessary,” Act for America said. “From the founding of this republic, the expectation was crystal clear: those entrusted with making laws for the United States must owe their complete and undivided loyalty to America.”

The Constitution sets qualifications for service in Congress, which are a minimum age (25 years old for the House and 30 years old for the Senate), a period of U.S. citizenship (7 years for the House and 9 years for the Senate) and residency in the state represented. However, it does not restrict foreign citizenship.

Actually, from my own memory of the naturalization process, one of the steps towards becoming a U..S. citizen is formally renouncing under oath one’s previous citizenship.  One would think, therefore, that the issue should be moot, and not require a law which underlines the regulation, but it appears that one would be wrong.

And as much as I dislike the appearance of yet another fucking law to join the raft of laws already in situ, I would truly support legislation which would require that all Congress members be required to surrender their non-U.S. passports in public — i.e. as part of their swearing-in ceremony — with failure to do so resulting in immediate disqualification and a by-election to bring someone else into office.

Hell, I think I’d support that such a law be applied to any level of government, federal, state or local.  (Congressional staffers and similar remora also come to mind, by the way.)

Let’s have our republic run by actual Americans, and not something-Americans.


I should point out that no freshly-minted U.S. citizen ever jettisoned their native passport with the alacrity that I did.  I couldn’t wait to get rid of the fucking thing, just as I heartily tossed my (cut-up) Illinois Firearms Owner ID (FOID) card into the Mississippi River on my final trip from Chicago to Texas.

Market Garden Final Thoughts

From Longtime Friend & Reader Sage Grouch comes this response to last week’s Market Garden post:

Thanks for the flattering request for my opinion.

Montgomery, for whom I have a mixed opinion because of his terrific performance in the African desert versus his lackluster performance on mainland Europe (Caen, anyone?), famously said that Market-Garden was “90% successful;” sadly for the Allies that means it was in fact a strategic failure. No question, as you say, it saw some stunning victories at Eindhoven, Vegel, Grave, and Groesbeek;  and Frost’s paras, and the Poles, were nothing short of magnificent. But I think it would be fair to say that British airborne forces were gutted for the rest of the war after Market-Garden, particularly the 1st Abn Div, which suffered 75-80% casualties and never fully recovered, playing no more combat role (as opposed to the US 82nd and 101st Abn Divs who went on to even more glory in the Bulge and beyond). The 6th AbnD, their other para division, was still refitting after Normandy and played only a minor backup role in the Bulge.

In the larger context of Market-Garden’s strategic failure, this loss was compounded by the operational cost: elite troops, including very valuable officers who could have been husbanded for future opportunities (or used more conservatively) were instead expended in a high-risk gamble that yielded only a vulnerable salient.

There were certainly some wins for the Allies as a result of Market-Garden. As has been said, the US 82nd and 101st performed brilliantly and largely achieved their objectives, not least of which was holding “Hell’s Highway” against fierce German counterattacks. The offensive freed a big swath of south and central Netherlands, including some V-2 launch sites and, of course, liberating a large number of Dutch civilians, who were thus spared the worst effects of the “Hunger Winter” yet to come. It inflicted large losses on the two German SS Panzer divisions that were refitting in the area, which affected Hitler’s ability to use them as he would have liked in the Bulge in December. And to be sure, the area captured was a useful jumping-off salient for operations in 1945, even though that wasn’t one of the stated objectives of the operation.

Having said that…

As we’ve said, seizure of the Arnhem bridge and establishment of a firm bridgehead over the Lower Rhine was the stated goal of the whole exercise, and that failed; with it failed the plan to outflank the Westwall and end the war 7-8 months earlier than it ultimately did, with all the casualties and physical damage to Europe caused during that period. (And no seizure of Berlin by the Western Allies, which could have shaped the Cold War in Europe differently for half a century. I like to think Eisenhower would not have stopped at the Elbe had his forces gotten that far by, say, November or December 1944, when the Russians were still ~300 miles and several months away, on the Vistula, but I could well be optimistic about that.)

The resulting salient after the operation was a vulnerable “bulge” that had to be defended by a large number of Allied troops who could have been used elsewhere, instead of acting as a springboard for further offensive operations. And I’ve already talked about the damage to British airborne capability and the high overall cost in elite troops and equipment.

So I maintain that Market-Garden was a strategic and operational failure, which featured many brilliant tactical performances.

To my mind, the most important part of how Market Garden turned out is what I missed, i.e. “It inflicted large losses on the two German SS Panzer divisions that were refitting in the area, which affected Hitler’s ability to use them as he would have liked in the Bulge in December.”  The effect of that attrition on the Bulge attack was incalculable.

So we’re all clear on the matter:  I respect Mr. Grouch’s opinion on the WWII Western Front as I do few others.  (He’s actually a twice-published author on the Battle Of The Bulge, so his expertise in these matters is beyond question.)  And fortunately for me, our views on the above are so similar as to be pretty much identical.

Thanks, buddy.

Shared Concerns

For once, there’s an article worth reading at National Review, and for once, I find myself somewhat in agreement with the rabid Leftoids (albeit for different reasons).

[T]here’s a consistent and surprisingly effective effort to convince you that the biggest threat to your community is the plans for a new AI data center on the other side of town. Read on.
Democrats’ Data Center Obsession

Back in 2024, I observed that when some of America’s biggest tech companies realized that they needed significantly more electrical power to run their data centers in the decades to come, they decided that restarting decommissioned nuclear plants was the best, most cost-effective, and most reliable option. And with the seeming snap of their fingers, a slew of those closed nuclear plants were scheduled to start operating again in the coming years.

And it wasn’t just Republican governors like Glenn Youngkin of Virginia eager to re-embrace nuclear power; Democrats like Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro, Washington Governor Jay Inslee, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer, and Virginia Senators Mark Warner and Tim Kaine all jumped on board. It was a case of the right policy finally being enacted after decades of foot-dragging and fearmongering, but more than a little frustrating that years of conservatives winning the policy argument and being right on the facts didn’t move the needle on the issue; it was Microsoft, Amazon, Google, and other big companies simply saying, “We want this.”

We should have known that eventually the progressive wing of the Democratic Party would wake up and galvanize opposition; now an increasingly loud swath of Americans, mostly on the left, seem to hate data centers the way they used to hate your SUV, your Big Mac, and, well, you.

Of course, the reason the Watermelons are being stirred to violence is because electricity is eeeevil, as is nuuuuclear powerrrr etc. etc.

I don’t care about any of that.

What concerns me about A.I. is more of a philosophical nature because while I can see many benefits of having computing power save humans a lot of grunt work and so on, I am profoundly disturbed by the implications of letting A.I. run things — and more especially, run the activities and affairs of humans.  As long as it’s a tool, therefore, I think I can get behind it;  but as a management system, I remain deeply skeptical.

And my skepticism stems from two sources.

Firstly, I think it’s all too easy (through laziness or indifference) to hand over the reins to outside control — we just have to see how cars are being thus transformed as an example — and as far as I’m concerned, the jury is still out (way far out) on whether this is a good, bad or evil thing.

My second concern stems from the basic premise of A.I., as I’ve said before, in that the collective [sic] wisdom can form a secure foundation for intelligence.  As someone who has often used and manipulated data myself, I am intimately familiar with how this process can be affected by, let’s call it malevolent forces.  And whereas in the past one could rely on some kind of human element to be a firewall on this issue, we are now faced with the prospect of A.I.-driven bots to not only speed up the process massively, but also to conceal what’s actually going on.

I’m not going to do anything stupid like bomb some data center, of course, nor would I ever support the assholes that do this kind of thing.  If they do something vile like this, or even plan to do something like this and get caught, then by all means hang them, bury them under a prison or stick them in some deep dark jail cell forever.

I do think that we aren’t being careful enough with the drive to A.I., because the guys who are building it are obsessed with performance / generation.  As with all science, though, we need to continuously ask ourselves the question:  “Just because we can, are we sure that we should?”

And I see very few people asking that question of A.I. — which means that the field of resistance is being left open for the loony Leftoids.

“Bannings”

Ran into this little A.I. video SOTI, and while none of it concerns me — yet — I think there are a couple of things worth noting.

The “12 Guns Being Banned in 2026” are interesting, although none of them fall within my “I Want This Thing In My Gun Safe” parameters, mostly because they are chambered in calibers that don’t interest me (although that new Zastava M70…hmmm), too expensive (e.g. Daniel Defense) or else I’m just not interested in that type of gun (e.g. Tavor 12ga multi-tube shotgun).

However, what does interest me is that the GFW state legislators — all the usual suspects, plus Vermont (!!! WTF?) — have decided that if they can’t ban a gun just because it’s a gun, they’re going to ban it because it’s “military-specific” (like that matters), “common sporting purposes” (ditto), “concealable” (ditto) or, more worryingly, because of various features that they don’t like.  In other words, the guns are becoming too efficient and reliable, and only the military should have access to these features (again, bullshit, but it’s what they’re running with).

It’s a long video and both boring and/or irritating (#A.I.narration), but like I said, what it reveals is the ways with which the GFWs are targeting guns.  And my Virginia Readers should pay special attention because that’s the direction your state is heading if it’s not there already (ditto Colorado, a.k.a. Eastern California).

Of course, the Second Amendment Foundation will get involved at some point, and maybe a few of these abuses will reach the Supreme Court to have their pee-pees whacked;  but that’s leaving our fate in the hands of lawyers, which is always a risky proposition.

However, there may come a time when some guy (or guys) will get sick of all this bullshit and say “Come and get them” to which the state will reply “Challenge accepted” and the whole thing will end in tears.  I should point out that this is precisely the outcome these totalitarian bastards are hoping for.

Be careful out there, buy more ammo, and practice a lot.  And now if you’ll excuse me, I’m off to the range.


Afterthought:  I think it’s time I should look at one of those FRT (forced recoil trigger) thingies, just because I suspect that they will soon be a definite target for the GFWs.  Which is why I should get one, most probably for the FrankenPoodleShooter.

Likewise, as soon as I can buy a moderator (“silencer”) over the counter without paperwork, that too will be added to the above.  Not because I especially want one, but because they don’t want me to have one.

Revision

I have to say that I’ve always thought that WWII’s Operation Market Garden was actually a very successful military campaign, and not the horrible failure as it’s been painted.  And this guy agrees with me:

In fact, the operation succeeded at six of its seven principal objectives, a rate of achievement that would be considered remarkable in almost any other military context. The American 82nd Airborne Division, under Brigadier General James Gavin, faced the daunting task of seizing the great road bridge at Nijmegen across the Waal River, one of the widest river crossings in Western Europe. They did so after brutal urban combat and a daylight assault river crossing in canvas boats under direct enemy fire, one of the most audacious tactical actions of the entire war.7 The bridge was taken intact even after the Germans tried to blow it up. The 101st Airborne Division, led by Major General Maxwell Taylor, seized the majority of its assigned bridges and canal crossings in the southern portion of the corridor and held the vital road that the operation depended on, quickly dubbed “Hell’s Highway” by the soldiers who fought along it, against repeated and determined German counterattacks. British armored units of XXX Corps advanced deeper into occupied territory in a shorter period than in any previous operation in the Western campaign. The scale of what was accomplished tends to disappear in the shadow of Arnhem, but it was genuinely extraordinary, representing the successful coordination of tens of thousands of men, hundreds of aircraft, and an armored column driving north along a single road through hostile country.

I have read a ton of history on the topic — WWII is very much a period of history near to my heart — and I think that too often Market Garden is used a lot by American historians to have a go at Brit Field Marshal Montgomery.  (He’s too often caricatured instead of appreciated.  Not that I have a problem with that, in general terms, because he set himself up for it pretty much all the way through the war.  But we tend to forget that the reason Monty was so cautious a military commander was that he was faced with the stark fact that British and Commonwealth manpower’s losses were, to use the modern term, quite unsustainable.)

Going back to Market Garden:  it may well have been a bridge too far (Arnhem), but its only real failure was that even if it had been a total success, it’s doubtful that it would have been the war-ender that Montgomery believed it would be.

I await Reader Sage Grouch’s informed opinion on this.

Amateurs Vs. Professionals

In which some smart guy compares the hard-headed and realistic professionalism of Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran vs. that of the feckless Obama administration.

While then-Secretary of State John Kerry famously treated Iranian negotiators like esteemed colleagues, Vice President JD Vance just treated them like a landlord dealing with a delinquent tenant who thinks he owns the building.

I’d like to think that was Kerry’s underpinning philosophy — simple foolishness and a massive misread of the room — but then I’d have to think that Fuckface’s dealings with Iran didn’t involve in-depth discussions with Barack Traitor Obama, who always had another, more malevolent attitude towards his adopted country.

The fact of the matter is that the Obama administration sold the United States out to Iran — with cash as well as white-glove treatment — and it’s taken us this long to reverse that ghastly policy.