From Longtime Friend & Reader Sage Grouch comes this response to last week’s Market Garden post:
Thanks for the flattering request for my opinion.
Montgomery, for whom I have a mixed opinion because of his terrific performance in the African desert versus his lackluster performance on mainland Europe (Caen, anyone?), famously said that Market-Garden was “90% successful;” sadly for the Allies that means it was in fact a strategic failure. No question, as you say, it saw some stunning victories at Eindhoven, Vegel, Grave, and Groesbeek; and Frost’s paras, and the Poles, were nothing short of magnificent. But I think it would be fair to say that British airborne forces were gutted for the rest of the war after Market-Garden, particularly the 1st Abn Div, which suffered 75-80% casualties and never fully recovered, playing no more combat role (as opposed to the US 82nd and 101st Abn Divs who went on to even more glory in the Bulge and beyond). The 6th AbnD, their other para division, was still refitting after Normandy and played only a minor backup role in the Bulge.
In the larger context of Market-Garden’s strategic failure, this loss was compounded by the operational cost: elite troops, including very valuable officers who could have been husbanded for future opportunities (or used more conservatively) were instead expended in a high-risk gamble that yielded only a vulnerable salient.
There were certainly some wins for the Allies as a result of Market-Garden. As has been said, the US 82nd and 101st performed brilliantly and largely achieved their objectives, not least of which was holding “Hell’s Highway” against fierce German counterattacks. The offensive freed a big swath of south and central Netherlands, including some V-2 launch sites and, of course, liberating a large number of Dutch civilians, who were thus spared the worst effects of the “Hunger Winter” yet to come. It inflicted large losses on the two German SS Panzer divisions that were refitting in the area, which affected Hitler’s ability to use them as he would have liked in the Bulge in December. And to be sure, the area captured was a useful jumping-off salient for operations in 1945, even though that wasn’t one of the stated objectives of the operation.
Having said that…
As we’ve said, seizure of the Arnhem bridge and establishment of a firm bridgehead over the Lower Rhine was the stated goal of the whole exercise, and that failed; with it failed the plan to outflank the Westwall and end the war 7-8 months earlier than it ultimately did, with all the casualties and physical damage to Europe caused during that period. (And no seizure of Berlin by the Western Allies, which could have shaped the Cold War in Europe differently for half a century. I like to think Eisenhower would not have stopped at the Elbe had his forces gotten that far by, say, November or December 1944, when the Russians were still ~300 miles and several months away, on the Vistula, but I could well be optimistic about that.)
The resulting salient after the operation was a vulnerable “bulge” that had to be defended by a large number of Allied troops who could have been used elsewhere, instead of acting as a springboard for further offensive operations. And I’ve already talked about the damage to British airborne capability and the high overall cost in elite troops and equipment.
So I maintain that Market-Garden was a strategic and operational failure, which featured many brilliant tactical performances.
To my mind, the most important part of how Market Garden turned out is what I missed, i.e. “It inflicted large losses on the two German SS Panzer divisions that were refitting in the area, which affected Hitler’s ability to use them as he would have liked in the Bulge in December.” The effect of that attrition on the Bulge attack was incalculable.
So we’re all clear on the matter: I respect Mr. Grouch’s opinion on the WWII Western Front as I do few others. (He’s actually a twice-published author on the Battle Of The Bulge, so his expertise in these matters is beyond question.) And fortunately for me, our views on the above are so similar as to be pretty much identical.
Thanks, buddy.